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In order to explain in a systematic way why certain combinations of market, financial, and
legal structures may be intrinsic to certain capabilities to exchange real goods, we introduce
criteria for abstracting the qualitative functions of markets. The criteria involve the number of
strategic freedoms the combined institutions, considered as formalized strategic games, present to
traders, the constraints they impose, and the symmetry with which those constraints are applied
to the traders. We pay particular attention to what is required to make these “strategic market
games” well-defined, and to make various solutions computable by the agents within the bounds on
information and control they are assumed to have. As an application of these criteria, we present a
complete taxonomy of the minimal one-period exchange economies with symmetric information and
inside money. A natural hierarchy of market forms is observed to emerge, in which institutionally
simpler markets are often found to be more suitable to fewer and less-diversified traders, while the
institutionally richer markets only become functional as the size and diversity of their users gets
large.
JEL categories: C7, G10, G20, L10, D40, D50
Keywords: Strategic market games, clearinghouses, credit evaluation, default

I.

INTRODUCTION: A FOUNDATION FOR
ANALYSIS OF MARKETS

The empirical diversity of markets, and the financial
and legal institutions that support them, lends itself to
two types of analysis. The first is essentially descriptive and frequently historical, aiming at an account of
the detailed structure and operation of the many instruments and institutions in any real market system. The
second could be called “causal”, aiming to explain how
differently-structured markets compare to each other in
abstract function, and how a functional distinction may
lead to preference for certain specific institutional structures.
Nothing mysterious is intended here by the term “abstract function”. One long-range goal of a causal theory
of markets should be to determine whether definite institutional structures can be sensibly selected and sustained
according to what they enable people to do from day to
day, somewhat independently of the particular histories
through which any given instance may have come about.
Since the operation of real markets is complex, and the
diversity among their histories enormous, it is a nontrivial matter to separate those details that may be history
dependent from those that could not be otherwise and
still allow the surrounding society to function as it does.
This paper and its companion [1] provide a set of fundamental criteria for generalizing the function of markets, and a taxonomy based on it that includes all of the
distinguishable forms of one-period exchange with inside
money [2].
The function of markets can be generalized in many

domains and at many levels. The physical existence of
marketplaces, and the effects of physical structure on
costs and time efficiency, are important and must be
quantitatively analyzed at some stage. However, it is
the informational structure of markets that is most easily categorized prior to specifying the larger context of
social life, and the one that will be of concern here. Markets and their supporting institutions define algorithms
for distributed computation and realization of resource
re-allocations, by agents with limited spheres of control
and often of knowledge. The most basic criteria for the
informational categorization of all markets involve the
choices of actions they offer to agents, the constraints
they impose to allow the agents to arrive at consistent
and agreeable allocations, and the symmetry with which
agents are subjected to those constraints. Classification
according to these serves as a foundation on which finer
distinctions may be drawn, or other domains of function
projected.
The real rules of bidding and exchange, which may
make realizable markets nonequivalent, are often obviated by the assumptions of general equilibrium theory.
The non-cooperative equilibria of finite, playable market
games [3] are generally not the same as the competitive
equilibria in the same systems, due to the strategic considerations agents have about the effects of their own
actions on prices. Markets that remove subsets of such
actions from agents’ strategy sets can differ from those
where the strategies remain, in the agents’ computations
of optimality and ultimately in their final allocations.
This distinction is completely lost in the general equilibrium representation of agents as price takers.
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As a corollary of the absence of price impacts in the
competitive equilibrium concept, the possibility that different markets may impose the constraints of consistency
asymmetrically on agents is also overlooked. Agents who
are permitted by the market’s “rules of the game” to exert control on prices have qualitatively different strategic
freedoms than those who are not, and these can lead to
biased outcomes even under conditions not warranted by
their initial allocations or preferences. This consideration becomes important in assessing the relative value of
using a commodity as money versus a non-consumable
financial instrument. Thus the concept of Pareto optimality in the context of price-taking is a good beginning
notion of the quality of solutions a market makes available, but it leaves many important distinctions among
realizable markets unaddressed.
The goal of these two papers [1] is twofold. It is first
to present a principled set of criteria for grouping markets and generalizing their functions, and an associated
approach to instantiating the distinctions with minimal
representative models. It is second to define a notion
of causality, whereby a given institutional structure may
be recognized as necessary to achieve allocations with
specified properties of symmetry, feasibility, or robustness under constraints that may befall agents’ endowments. The position will be adopted that markets must
be represented as playable games, and that the definition
of market function must be separated from the choice of
agents’ initial conditions and also from their definitions
of what constitute acceptable solutions.
Three concepts – dimensionality, counting of strategic
freedoms and constraints, and symmetry – will be argued
in Sec. II to be the foundation for an informational theory
of markets, and for the use of models to derive its claims.
Dimensional analysis, though not new to economics [4]
will be very briefly reviewed as the conceptual tool requiring nontrivial minimal structures. The indexing of
freedoms will then be extended into a more general concept of simplicity and complexity within the constraints
forced by dimensioning. Symmetry (considered in General Equilibrium Theory mostly through the dubious device of social welfare utilities) will then be shown to be
the next most fundamental concept after dimensions and
degrees of freedom, in qualitatively distinguishing markets as strategic games. Using test utilities to categorize
market rules by symmetry appears on the surface only
subtly different from assigning a meaning to the exchange
symmetry of the utilities themselves. However, a symmetry of the rules remains a well-defined property at general
agent specification, and so may be discussed apart from
the question of how agents can or should be compared.
It also respects better the spirit of welfare analysis in
economics, which is not to declare that people are interchangeable, but to determine whether markets inflict
unnecessary or counterproductive biases on them.
The conventions used in this paper for generating minimal models according the the proposed categorization
will then be given in Sec. III, and a short treatment

of the associated natural measure of allocative efficiency
given in Sec. IV. These are then followed by a list of the
market structures in Sec. V. The examples will extend
only through one-period exchange, with payment in cash
or credit. Fiat money will not be considered here, because the additional function it bestowes is first defined
in the context of multiperiod models, or with more explicit treatment of trust and its role in boundedly rational
solution concepts.

II.

THE ROLE OF MODELING IN ANALYSIS
AND INTERPRETATION

A theory of money and markets must ultimately draw
its validation from predictive, quantitative models. However, it is an error to equate the notion of theory with
nothing more than a particular model or class of models.
An even greater fallacy is to assign significance to models
which happen to be numeric, if one has not first taken
care to show that the standards of measurement defining the numbers are relevant to the economic phenomena
described.
To present a taxonomy of markets here that cannot be
taken for just a collection of ad hoc models, it is necessary to introduce standards of logical necessity and minimality. Under these, the collection of models becomes a
theory in a larger sense than just a set of examples.
The first step in defining both simplicity and necessity
is to require that real markets, which may differ in their
instantiation, be categorizable according to the types of
allocations they make accessible to agents with specified
control, knowledge, and preferences. Such categorization
may be performed at many levels of refinement; here the
counting of agents’ degrees of strategic freedom and the
symmetry of their final allocations will be used.
The second step is to be specific about the criteria by
which one good is substitutable for another to the agents
or institutions, and to recognize that ideal substitutability (or fungibility, formalized in the notion of dimensionality) places constraints on the forms of prices, marketclearing rules, and legal actions. These constraints imply
necessary minimal levels of structure and differentiation.
Once the resulting category criteria are known, one
must refine these to criteria of simplicity within categories, according to temporal dependence, common
knowledge, preference, and rationality. By these criteria,
there will be a hierarchy of models within a given category. The simplest model within a category then serves
as a minimal, or “most generic” form that generates the
function of the category, and the least that can be assumed in order to produce that function. In comparing
any aspect of function, features separating the simplest
models in the compared categories may be recognized
as “necessary” to the distinction between them. If the
models are hierarchical, in the sense that one contains a
superset of the institutions in the other, then minimality
ensures that every institution added by the larger cate-
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gory is indispensable if the extra functionality associated
with it is to be achieved.
It is important to note, however, that the taxonomy
of function is not generally hierarchical in any obvious
way. There can be functions provided by institutionally
more specialized market systems that are not provided
by the less specialized ones, but other functions of which
the converse is true.
Because the defining constraints on the minimal models within any category are induced by dimensionality
and strategic freedom, more complex models within the
category can only differ from the minimal cases by the
addition of either structures or parameters that are not
required by the categorization. Since the categorization
is what elevates the set of its minimal models to an interpretive theory, one can avoid mistaking all the other
possible structure in non-minimal models as being “theoretically” motivated. If one then wishes to account for
their empirical existence as more than frozen accidents
of history, that requires a refinement of the functional
categorization, which can produce those features in its
minimal representations.
This approach to analysis could be called “effective
market theory”, by association with the same mode of
analysis in physics. The physical version, called “effective field theory” [5], removed a long-standing mystery
about why models of fundamental processes were found
to work. It showed that, for every process identified by
its symmetries and degrees of freedom, there was a minimally complex mathematical model instantiating those
properties, whose features could properly be understood
as causing that process.

A.

The necessary constraints on minimal models

The minimal structure a market system can have is
one that recognizes all of the distinctions among types of
goods acted on in a rationalizable way by the collection
of agents. (Alternatively put, the structure of the market
determines which distinctions are offered to the agents to
act on strategically.)
Dimensions: Ultimately it is the imposition of criteria
of fungibility that determines what is to be indistinguishable from what else, and there can be considerable freedom in choosing these. However, once they are chosen,
it is adherence to them that makes the antecedents of
economic numbers (objects in the world) into quantities
that can be sensibly added, subtracted, and so forth.
The idea of fungibility is captured in the concept of
a dimension. It may be that one bushel of corn at a
particular time and place can be substituted in essentially all respects for another like bushel at the same
time and place, while corn cannot be substituted in all
respects for a paper dollar, since the dollar is not good
to eat, and perhaps the corn cannot be used in exchange
at some markets. The category of things thus fungible

by some specified set of criteria is said to define a dimension. Equations must be homogeneous in dimension to
even admit of making sense [4].
Degrees of freedom: The criterion of strategic freedom
is captured in the set of decision variables that the rules
of the game allow agents to choose. Each such variable is
called a degree of freedom, and the number of these may
be counted. Constraints that restrict decision variables
to include open intervals do not change the number of
the degrees of freedom in a system, but those that restrict them to points do, and must be countable as some
definite negative number of degrees of freedom.
Symmetry: We will choose to require that market function be specified and well-defined, prior to commitment
to allocations for the participants, or to a solution concept for them. However, in cases where the allocations
or solution concepts may be preserved under some permutation of the agents, there arises a discrete symmetry
in the description of their state prior to their interaction
with the trade and financial apparatus. It then becomes
a sensible (and relevant) question, whether a given market structure has the flexibility to produce solutions that
have the full symmetry of the initial conditions.
Careful use of dimensions will imply nontrivial minimal
levels of structure for prices and market-clearing rules,
and the requirement for models capable of distinguishing
symmetries of inputs and outcomes will motivate minimal forms for allocations and utilities in a subset of cases.
When a complexity hierarchy is chosen, particular minimal forms will be selected as those whose only content is
that required by the dimensions and symmetry, and these
will in general be unique. Models that are more complex
than the minimal forms will necessarily require addition
of either dimensional factors beyond those required to
define the functions of trade or clearing, or additional
nondimensional constants that are not simply unity.

B.

Complexity hierarchy for information and
clearing rules

Without digressing into a formal definition of the complexity of algorithms, it is sufficient for a theory of markets to commit to any definite and reasonable ordering,
by which one algorithm will be called more or less complex than another. We will use the following rules:
• Simultaneous actions are simpler than serial actions.
• Fewer decision variables for agents in their interactions with markets are simpler than more variables.
The fewest nontrivial variables is one per agentmarket pairing, and it is natural to make this a
choice of a bid for goods. Markets at this level, to
be nontrivial, must require that agents put their
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entire initial allocations up for sale, removing the
choice of how much to offer. Such cases, called “sellall” markets, are treated thoroughly in Ref. [6], and
will not be reconsidered here.
The next simplest structure creates two variables
per agent-market pairing, and it is natural to make
these bids and amounts of supply. These markets
include the sell-all case, and allow a broader and
more interesting set of possible means of payment.
The examples in the following taxonomy will all be
of this type.
The next simplest market structure admits four decision variables, which may be taken as bids and
quantities offered, and prices for these whose constraining function must be specified. At this level
of complexity, though, the simplest clearing mechanism not overconstrained by these inputs involves
contingency and rules to handle incomplete clearing
of bids and offers. These imply a qualitatively more
complex class of games, which will not be treated
here. (Examples in each of these categories have
been treated in Ref. [2], and references therein.)
• Within the realm of solution concepts, noncooperative concepts are simpler than cooperative
ones.
• Finally, among non-cooperative solution algorithms, pure-strategy Nash equilibria with maximal possible knowledge of other-agent utilities and
endowments are the simplest possible. While the
mechanics of the computation may be more involved than that for more knowledge-local algorithms, the full-knowledge Nash equilibrium is theoretically simpler than a bounded-rationality concept, because it does not require the additional distinction between what is shared and what is local
knowledge.
C.

Separating games, situations, and solution
concepts

It is natural, in representing markets as games in
strategic form, to discipline the building of models by
enforcing a strict separation of the three essential concepts of game specification, agent situation, and solution
concept. Here, the three stages will also be given a prioritization:
1. The agent strategy sets, the rules for price formation, and their effect on allocations, must be specified without regard to the initial conditions affecting the agents who play the game, or the solution
concept by which they choose strategies.
2. Once a market is specified in this way, the situations of agents, such as initial allocations or constraints on cash, must be specified without regard

to the solution concept assumed for the agents, or
how it will constrain the solutions.
3. A solution concept must contain a complete specification of what each agent wants and what he
knows, about himself and possibly other agents interacting with the markets. For a market to generate a solution, it must be possible for all of the
agents to compute their solution strategies within
the bounds of their knowledge.
Enforcing this separation will make clear that the function of markets is to put the computation of consistent
allocation decisions within reach of agents who have limited spheres of control (and more generally of knowledge).
Even under conditions of the most rationality sensibly definable, some market structures will make more solutions
computable than others.
The prioritization chosen here is not the only one that
could be used. We emphasize it because it will sometimes be the case that, in markets that do not generally
make solutions computable, some fine-tuning of the rules
of the game (say, its bankruptcy penalties or a credit supply) in explicit relation to agent utility scales would solve
the problem. This kind of fine-tuning violates the whole
point, though, that markets are supposed to be aggregating devices specified more generally than any instance or
subset of the population they serve. It is therefore inappropriate to the kind of theory sought here, and this
hierarchy offers a clean way to rule it out.

D.

Computability

In general equilibrium theory, prices are a pure accounting tool, and their normalization is arbitrary. While
there is thus no way to determine absolute price scale, it
also has no effect on the definition of competitive equilibrium; all information about the equilibria is resident in
agents’ preferences and endowments, and the Walrasian
definition of wealth preservation. Even in this very special case, when the dynamics of attaining equilibrium
are considered, algorithms proven to find some equilibrium cannot in general find all equilibria, or select among
them.
Common knowledge of preferences and endowments is
part of complete specification of the strategic form of
market games, and like competitive equilibria, their noncooperative solutions will in general be indeterminate [7].
One form of indeterminacy in some of the one-period
models arises from the inability of the noncooperative
solution concept to specify a unique degree of wash sales.
NE exist at all such degrees, and yet the best response
of each agent requires as input the degrees of wash sales
engaged in by all others. Such forms of indeterminacy
most closely resemble those of CE (though here they can
be continuous rather than discrete), in that they do not
involve the overall scale of prices, and merely reflect an
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incompleteness in the specification of the solution concept by the endowments and preferences.
In market games, though, assumptions about the scale
of prices become a nontrivial part of agents’ strategic
choices, and are not included in the common knowledge
of the game specification. While the overall scale of prices
remains unimportant as in general equilibrium, in market games the ability of agents to coordinate the scales
they use in bidding is essential to arriving at any NE.
When independent price scale assumptions can be hidden within agent strategy sets, this induces a severe form
of indeterminacy not present in general equilibrium theory. Resolving the indeterminacy within the one-period
context is one of the major driving forces behind the
credit-evaluating institutions derived here. Explaining
the function of these institutions is another way in which
the process orientation of the game description of markets
exposes qualitative omissions in the perfect-competition
idealization.

III.

CONVENTIONS FOR REPRESENTING
MARKET STRUCTURES

To apply any of these principles quantitatively, of
course, one must actually build models, and this requires
conventions and notation. We will use the framework
standard for strategic market games [3], assuming primitive notions of agents with strategy sets, consumable
goods of which they have initial and final allocations
(possibly zero), and preferences represented by ordinal
utilities of the final allocations. From any cardinalization of these (as long as boundary parameters such as
bankruptcy penalties are made sufficiently large), purestrategy Nash equilibria may be computed, in which the
final allocations do not depend on the cardinalization.[20]

A.

B.

Agents, goods, and allocations

Agents come in a number m of types, with a number r replicas of each type (replication allows treatment
of those aspects of competition not arising from specialization). Each agent is indexed by a subscript i ∈
(1, . . . , mr). It will frequently be convenient to arrange
the replicas serially, so that agent indices i ∈ (1, . . . , m)
may also be taken to represent types.
Consumable goods also come in m types, for the convenience that later each agent type may be made the
sole provider of one good, as an illuminating special
case. Goods are indexed with superscript j ∈ (1, . . . , m).
(More general cases, in which agent types may be distinguished by preferences, yet be sole producers of a common good, are regarded as hybrid from the simplified
forms shown here.)
Market trade takes place in a single period, offering
each agent a set of strategic choices, and computing from
the collection of values chosen a transformation from initial to final allocations of the goods for all agents. The
initial allocation of good j to agent i will be called an
endowment, and denoted aji . The final allocations resulting from interaction with the markets are denoted Aji . A
utility for agent i is a function of the final allocations of
his consumable goods Ui A1i , . . . , Am
i .
Markets function by aggregating and disaggregating
both consumable goods offered for sale and bids, which
may be consumable or may be essentially financial in nature. Even nonconsumable bids are goods, in the sense
that they enter and leave the system according to specified rules, and are preserved in the act of exchange.
However, such goods are distinguished from consumable
goods in conferring no utility on the holder.
If the bids are of a separate type from the consumable goods, each agent i is characterized by an additional
“monetary” state variable, with initial value mi (possibly
zero) and final value Mi .

Depth of treatment
C.

It is important to appreciate that all of the models
generated as instantiations have more depth and interpretive power than will be developed here. It is not the
goal of this paper to pursue all of the consequences of
each model, and many particular cases have been thoroughly treated elsewhere, as is noted below.
Thus, for instance, the importance of constraints on
cash or credit, or how these relate to which commodity
is used to guarantee promissory notes, will not be considered if they are not so tight as to change the number
of degrees of freedom. Similarly, while there are many
possible relations between the number of distinguishable
goods and the number of distinct or redundant agents
as identified by their preferences, only the minimal combinations that express consequences of the symmetry or
asymmetry of rules will be developed.

Trading posts, clearing houses, courts, and
credit evaluators

Markets are realized in the form of trading posts, with
a single post receiving all offers of one good to be sold.
Each agent i strategically chooses a set of offer quantities
qij for all posts j, and in the models below the restriction
0 ≤ qij ≤ aji will be imposed.
The trading posts are defined by an algorithm that
clears all bids and offers, and defines a unique price at
each post for all exchanges of its good. The institutional
guarantee of a law of one price distinguishes market trading from barter, even in cases where independent posts
provide direct exchange of any good for any other.
The unique clearing rule constrained by the dimensions
of price, synchronous strategy choice by each agent without knowledge of other agents’ choices, and the absence
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of any other dimensional or dimensionless constants, is
P j
b
Bj
pj ≡ Pi ij ≡ j .
(1)
Q
i qi
The final allocation for agent i resulting from trade in
the market for good j is
Aji = aji − qij +

bji
,
pj

(2)

representing delivery of a fraction of the total goods at
post j, proportional to i’s fraction of the total bids at
that post. The final allocation of i’s means of payment
is
X j X j
Mi = m i −
bi +
qi p j ,
(3)
j

j

representing a disbursement from each post of its total
bids, in proportion to i’s fraction of its goods delivered.
(In Markets 1 and 2 below, where each good serves both
as commodity sold and means of payment, this rule will
require special definition, though it will take the same
general form.)
In cases where the bids are promissory notes, disbursements may be made at a central clearinghouse, rather
than at the trading posts. In such cases, the clearing
rule for the means of payment becomes



X j
Mi = max mi +
qi pj − bji , 0 .
(4)
j

In addition, a penalty may be assessed, representing
well-defined laws for bankruptcy. For convenience, the
penalty will be evaluated as a direct change of utilities
external to the market



X j
Ui → Ui + Π min mi +
qi pj − bji , 0 . (5)
j

The penalty constant Π formally induces a relation between market structure and the scale for cardinal agent
utilities, violating the prioritization of model building
stipulated above. Therefore it will only be used here
to define a boundary for interior solutions, where neither
the magnitude of Π nor the cardinal representation of Ui
affects the allocations or ordinal utility. (It is shown in
Ref. [6], that as long as Π is sufficiently harsh to preclude strategic bankruptcy by some limiting agent, such
interior solutions are assured.) The market and clearinghouse function remains well defined even for solutions
sampling the magnitude of Π; we simply resist assigning
that magnitude a theoretical significance of the sort the
rest of the results are given.
Courts provide the penalty function (5), in cases where
all clearing of goods and notes happens at the trading
posts. It is unimportant here whether the action of the

clearinghouse is represented as a combination of a pure
clearing activity with a court activity, or the court is represented as a degenerate clearinghouse with no requirement to handle goods.
It will be found that while clearinghouses and courts
may lead agents to “prefer” consistent solutions without bankruptcy, these institutions alone may not place
such solutions within their ability to calculate. This limitation will motivate introducing a degenerate form of
credit evaluation agency as it applies to systems without
exogenous uncertainty. Surprisingly, such an agency has
nontrivial function, though it is intuitively closer to that
of a foreign-exchange pricing body than a risk-assessing
credit evaluator. Nonetheless, from the function that
credit evaluation is designed to enable in general, that
designation will prove the logically proper, if degenerate,
one here.

D.

Agent symmetry and the issue of utilities

As we have required the description of markets to decompose – into game, situation, and solution concept –
utilities arise only in the last and most contingent part
of specifying the problem. This is good, since utilities
are also the most fragile and debatable part in the representation of economic decision making. Even weaker
than the defense of utilities is any abstract comparison
of preferences across agents, as would be assumed in a
social welfare function.
Nonetheless, it is a natural problem in market analysis
to ask what a given market would make possible if agents
were in some sense substitutable, and more defensibly,
if goods and their associations with agents were to be
permuted. A market is somehow qualitatively different
(and embeds differently in larger games), if it prohibits
agents from arriving at symmetric final states even if in
principle they are the same by some measure, than if it
can generate a symmetric solution for such agents.
The counting of a market’s strategic freedoms at general allocations requires no special assumptions about
utilities, though as usual if analytic interior solutions are
desired, sufficient ranges may be required of the allocations, and regularities of the utilities [6]. Examining the
capabilities of markets to respect symmetry, however, involves restrictions on both allocations and utilities, for
which it is helpful to choose specific forms. As in the
specification of prices and clearing rules, this can be done
in a most-informative, minimally-complex form.
For permutation of agents, or goods among agents,
to be meaningful, the agents or good distributions must
somehow be distinguishable. For it to distinguish among
markets, it must also imply the permuting of some restrictions. Both of these properties arise most simply in
a generalization of Jevons’ failure of double coincidence of
wants [8]. The failure occurs when agents’ allocation constraints remove the ability to place either bids or offers in
markets where the agents would benefit from respectively
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buying or selling goods.
If the general form of the endowments is written as a
matrix of components
h i
agen = aji ,
(6)

(the aji not generally assumed equal, but for convenience
assumed sufficient to produce interior solutions in the
markets considered) the case of maximal, and maximally
symmetric, failure of the double-coincidence of wants corresponds to the matrix (written for the first m agents, one
per type, and then replicated r times)
aspec = aI

(7)

where I is the m × m identity matrix.
(Eq. (7) is an abuse of notation, since obviously distinct goods are supposed to have distinct dimensions, and
should not be representable by a common constant. The
abuse is tolerable because the rules of market formation
will be specified at general aji and thus correctly dimensionally constrained. The correct relation of dimensions
to symmetry is obtained by recognizing that the value
of each final allocation in the utility must be nondimensionalized by some reference quantity, and that it is the
endowment scaled by the utility reference that can be set
to the common, dimensionless, constant a.)
Once agent types have been distinguished in a symmetric way by making each type the sole supplier (“specialist”) of one of the goods, maximal symmetry under
agent permutation is attained if all agents share the same
utility function, and if that function values all goods
equally. Technically
expressed, the property of utilities

Ui A1i , . . . , Am
that will define interior solutions is
i
∂Ui /∂Aji

j0

∂Ui /∂Ai

≡−

∂Aji

0

,

∂Aji

(8)

Ui

the relative price of any two goods j and j 0 .
The unique form of relative price that is
• Symmetric in all goods
• Constrained by the dimensions of relative price
• Involves no other dimensional or dimensionless parameters
is
−

0
∂Aji
∂Aji U
i

=

0
Aji
Aji

,

(9)

and the most general utilities producing this form are


Y j
(10)
Ui = f i  A i  .
j

The fi may be any monotone, concave functions, and it
may be desirable
to let fi be unbounded below as the
Q
argument j Aji → 0. The price relation (9) corresponds
as a minimal form, for purposes of sampling market symmetry through allocations and utilities, to the price relation (1), for purposes of enforcing market clearing.
E.

Dimensions and operators that act on them

The commonly recognized functions of money are as
numéraire, means of payment, and store of value, descriptions which also apply in different combinations to
other financial goods. From the perspective of symmetry, the choice of a money can also impose a form of
agent selection or identification, which may or may not
be desirable.
While the store-of-value function of money will not be
explored within one-period models, it will be helpful to
specify the meaning of the other functions more precisely
by listing their dimensions, and introducing two operators that act on dimensional quantities as representations
of the test for substitutability, and clearing of promissory
notes.
• Each consumable good is given a dimension, and
the name given to the dimension of the jth good
will be g j (think: “apples”, “oranges”, “pears”).
• There will in general be a numéraire, which is a
specific quantity of a specific good (think “one orange”). The numéraire therefore has both quantity
and dimension (in this case, the name of the dimension is “oranges”). The numéraire will be denoted
N.
• Personal credit takes the form of promissory notes
denominated in the numéraire. Specification of
the game must include defining who may produce
these, when they are to be paid, how they are exchanged for the denominated goods, and when or
if they may be destroyed. Promissory notes may
be written by individual agents or institutions like
central banks, and in general these are not substitutable and thus have different dimensions. The
name given to the dimension of a promissory note
written by agent i in numéraire N will be Ii (N ).
Promissory notes from a central bank will be given
dimension ICB (N ).
• The notation [ ] will be used for the operator on
a dimensional quantity that gives the name of its
dimension (example: [“one orange”] = “oranges”).
• The notation C ( ) will be used for the clearing operator that maps a promissory note for a good to
an amount of that good. The operator represents
the actions of a clearinghouse, and the need for it
becomes clear once one demands dimensional homogeneity of equations. As the example, if bji is
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a promissory note
oneunit of the
h i from agent i for 
j
numéraire N , bi = Ii (N ), and C bji = N .
F.

Graphical representations

A complete specification of a minimal market may now
be done easily, by listing the dimensions of the bids, offers, and numéraire, and diagrammatically representing
which goods are directly exchangeable for which others.
Only goods, penalties, and the institutional relations between them require graphical representation, since the
interaction of agents with the institutions is uniformly
applied according to the clearing rules given above, and
an event sequence described in the next subsection.
• A good, whether consumable or financial, is represented by a filled dot .
• The penalty variable applied by the courts is an
open circle .
• A trading post that takes in two goods is represented by a solid line between the dots representing the goods
. The goods may be consumables directly exchanged, or consumables offered and notes used in payment. They may be
specifically-assigned roles as bids and offers, or
there may be freedom in this assignment, as in Market 2 below. When there is more than one market
between the same two goods, as in Market 1 below,
the specification of which is bid and which offer distinguishes the posts, in which case the line between
them is made into a directional arrow
.

G.

The sequence of events and who does what

Markets, clearinghouses and courts, and credit evaluators, all participate in trade with a definite sequence,
which may be stylized by referring to periods of an imagined trading day. Offers and bids are delivered by agents
to the trading posts (markets) “in the morning”. If bids
are in promissory notes, and a credit evaluation agency
is used to evaluate their worth, this takes place through
an exchange between the trading posts and the evaluation agency “at noon” (if not, noon is an irrelevant
time). Bought goods and disbursements of payment for
sold goods are delivered from the markets to the agents
“in the afternoon”. If bids are in promissory notes, and
these notes must be cleared, an exchange takes place between the agents and clearinghouses “in the evening”,
when promissory notes are returned to their creators, and
if necessary penalties are assessed (if payment is in consumables, evening is an irrelevant time). Agents consume
their final allocation bundles entirely “at night”. Passage
of one day defines one complete period of exchange.
Agent ignorance of each other’s strategies is formalized by supposing that agents choose their qij and bji sets
before going to market in the morning. If bids are in
promissory notes, agents also write these de novo at the
time of determining bji .
The goal of clearinghouses is to exchange promissory
notes, possibly at an exchange rate determined by a
credit evaluator, so as to allow each agent to “buy back”
his own promissory notes by paying with the notes of others. Agents are then free to destroy notes of their own
writing at night, together with consuming their final allocations. The rules of the game prohibit agents from
destroying any promissory notes besides their own.

IV.

• A clearinghouse relation between goods is a dashed
line between the dots representing the goods
. In all the models built here, one of the
goods will be a promissory note, and the other the
underlying consumable.
• A court relation between a balance of goods and a
penalty assignment is also a dashed line
.
The court and the clearinghouse share a linestyle
that is different from that of the trading posts,
as the relation to the agents is essentially coercive
within the rules of these games, whereas the market
relation is essentially voluntary.
• A credit-evaluation relation between two forms of
promissory notes is given the same graphical representation as a market relation. Since they are both
goods, and the action of the credit evaluator is linear (involves no threshold relations), it functions
the same way as a different type of market with a
different clearing rule.

QUANTIFYING ALLOCATIVE
EFFICIENCY

The noncooperative equilibria of all of the one-period
strategic market games will be found to produce final
allocations that are are non-uniform in goods at aspec
endowments. Those that at least capture the symmetry of the agents relate to the competitive equilibrium
in the manner shown (for two agents and two goods)
in Fig. 1. (Those that do not lie off the hyperplane
P j
P j
j Ai =
j ai = a, ∀i.) While one measure of the
importance of the symmetry or asymmetry of allocations
is the incentive to veto they could create if these oneperiod markets were embedded in an institution-choosing
game, another is the overall efficiency of the trading solutions they generate. The goal of an efficiency description
should be a monetary value of exchange, in order to determine under what circumstances market structures can
“pay their way” from the functions they make available
to the traders.
The CE is generally considered a standard of efficiency
in neoclassical economics, in that it both inherits the op-
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P.S.

CE
PO (2)
δS1

NE (2)

PO (1)
NE (1)
0

NT
0

a

FIG. 1: Edgeworth box construction for two specialist producers with utilities of the form (10). Hyperbolae are preference
surfaces for agent 1, whose origin is in the lower left corner.
NT identifies the initial allocation, which is also the no-trade
solution for the final allocation. NE(1) and NE(2) are two final allocations as might arise from non-cooperative equilibria
in two different market situations (if this pair is replicated
r > 1 times). The dashed line P. S. is the Pareto set, and
PO(1) and PO(2) are points (also Pareto optima) to which a
speculator external to the system could move agent 1 by voluntary trading, from the corresponding NE allocations. CE is
the competitive equilibrium for this system. The limit of the
thin dashed hyperbola indicated by the small arrow suggests
a regularization of the speculator’s actions from the initial
endowments. In this limit, agent 1 is indifferent between his
initial endowment and the origin, in which case the speculator
can extract a. δS1 is the profit the speculator would lose from
such external manipulations, if the agents were somehow able
to attain NE(2) by internal trading, instead of NE(1) .

timality properties of the Pareto set, and respects the endowments according to a certain (Walrasian) prescription
for accounting. Such a qualitative notion of efficiency is
weaker than one would like, however, in a principled theory of markets, by several standards.
First, “efficiency” should mean something more than
optimality if it is to deserve a separate name, and in
particular it should indicate how to quantitatively compare general outcomes to each other and to the CE. A
weakness in the nontechnical use of efficiency is that it
contains no specification of how it should be quantified.
This results in independent notions of “allocative” and
“informational” efficiency, with no sense of whether these
share a name because they should have some relation to
each other. It even permits multiple uses within a single
mode of analyses, since it is unclear whether efficiency
should be constructed from an individual or economywide point of reference [9].

Second, even within neoclassical theory, it is well understood that the CE is not special if agents are allowed
any trading programme, and that in general they can arrive at any point on the contract curve by infinite recontracting of infinitesimal trades [10]. Thus if the CE is to
be a standard of efficiency, some better justification than
arbitrary fixation on Walrasian auction as a definition of
“wealth preservation” should be provided. Alternatively,
if the sensible definition of efficiency makes no special use
of the CE, that should be made clear by the theory, in
keeping with the approach that it should be possible to
omit anything not “explained” from a minimal instantiation.
Third, since the emphasis on playable games is that
their noncooperative solutions are in general not even
Pareto optima, a measure of allocative efficiency is only
useful to the extent that it indexes these. It must do so,
however, in a way that makes no special use of particular games, or even of the use of games to arrive at final
allocations.

A.

Efficiency from economic notions of work

An unambiguous definition of the efficiency of outcomes can be derived from the methodological correspondence of utility theory to physical thermodynamics [11],
where the term has a particular quantitative meaning.
Efficiency in physics and engineering (from which the economic usage was drawn [12]) refers to the ratio of work
extracted from a system, to an idealized greatest amount
of work extractable in principle. Mapping that usage
into utility theory requires only constructing the potential functions whose change is the economic equivalent of
“work”.
The details of that construction will be carried out
in App. B, but the result is easy to understand for the
aspec endowments and utilities (10) from Fig. 1. A given
allocation, such as a no-trade solution (NT) or a noncooperative equilibrium (NE) is less than perfectly efficient
if agents have potential welfare that remains unrealized
at that allocation. A natural measure of the unrealized
welfare for each agent is some bundle of goods that an
external speculator could extract from him by a sequence
of infinitesimal trades along his indifference surface from
that allocation (the worst kind of trading sequence he
could voluntarily be induced to accept). If the agent is
left at some point on the contract curve by the speculative extraction of goods, the speculator can then decouple
(for these models), and even if all agents are allowed subsequently to trade internally, by any algorithm, no further
advantageous trade will be possible. Since the price vector for goods at the final allocation will be common to all
the agents, it defines (up to a normalization) the value
of the bundle of goods any collection of speculators can
extract together from all the agents.
One then defines the welfare gain of each agent, resulting from internal trade, as the value of the goods-bundle
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that he has kept a speculator from extracting, relative
to that extractable from the NT solution. Since in the
aspec case, every agent’s endowment is indifferent to an
all-zero allocation bundle, from the NT P
solution
P a collection of speculators could extract all of j i aji = rma
from the collection of agents (valued according to prices
normalized to pj = 1, ∀j on the contract curve). In comparison, if the agents traded internally to any point on
the contract curve, by any path, the sum of their final
allocations would be the entire endowment. Hence their
gains from trade, expressed in money-metric, are rma.
(For each agent this is just the length of the segment of
contract curve from the origin to the Pareto optimum,
obtained by dotting the allocation vector with the normalized price vector.) While this result is immediately
clear for the CE by symmetry, it is also clearly true for
any other Pareto optimum, because relative to the CE
these differ only by exchange among the agents of a uni0

form bundle δAji = δAji , ∀j, j , for each i. Thus we
observe that the CE has no special role in the welfare
definitions relevant to allocative efficiency.
The value of a bundle extractable by an external speculator is the economic equivalent of the physical notion
of work, extracted by a load from a thermal system. The
agents’ utility gain in trading to the contract curve is
measured by just the reduction in work they could do on
external speculators (profit they could voluntarily surrender). While it is clear that the reduction for any speculator coupled to a single agent will depend on which Pareto
optimum the collection of agents finally reaches, is it also
clear that the reduction in work (speculative profit) from
combined exploitation of all the agents is an invariant.
It is with respect to this invariant shared gain that efficiency may be non-arbitrarily measured. Though it is
a utility gain, because it is expressed in a money-metric
induced by voluntary trade, it sensibly aggregates to a
measure of social welfare. The welfare gain by the agent
shown in Fig. 1, in going from N E (1) to N E (2) , is just
the length of the dark segment labeled δS1 . This quantity
happens also to be the increase in the utility-version of
agent 1’s entropy S1 from the transition N E (2) → N E (1)
(see Ref. [11] for motivation, and App. B for derivation
of this case).
It is natural, then, to define the efficiency η of any allocation as the ratio of the sum of utility gains by all the
agents from the NT solution, to the gain rma that they
could realize upon trading to the contract curve. This
gives an intrinsic measure to the fraction of the contract
curve for the endowments captured by any other allocation bundle. It is shown in App. B (though it is nothing
more than the translation of the verbal description here)
that

1/m
P Q j 1/m
im
j Ai
1 X m Y j 
.
η≡
=
Ai
rma
rm i a
j
0

(11)
Clearly η = 0 at the NT solution, and unity anywhere

on the contract curve. The index η will be computed for
each distinct allocation bundle that arises in the analysis
below. While for agent-symmetric solutions the result
will be unsurprising (that allocations further from the
contract curve are less efficient), this index also provides
a way to compare these results with the more complex
agent-nonsymmetric solutions produced by some forms
of commodity money.
V.

THE ONE-PERIOD SIMPLE-MARKET
TAXONOMY

Market 1 (All-for-all, directed)
gm

h

i
qijk
h[N ]i
bjk
i
 jk 
p

= gj
∀j, k
= various
= gk
∀j, k
=

gk
gj

g1

...

gm-1

∀j, k

m (m − 1) markets. Payment in goods; no
short sales, no credit. NE computable, symmetric, and robust to allocation constraints.

This is the market structure minimally distinguished
from barter, by enforcing a law of one price. Directexchange trading posts exist between all commodities j
and k, and are indexed superscript jk. Offers qijk in these
markets are thus of dimension g j and bids of dimension
g k . Each commodity serves as means of payment in m −
1 markets, and is offered for sale in m − 1 others. No
credit 
is offered in
 this market system, meaning that 0 ≤
P
jk
kj
≤ aji , for all agents i and all goods j.
k6=j qi + bi
At general endowments agen
o agent i has
n , each

in all markets.
2m (m − 1) strategic DOF, the qijk , bjk
i
Markets accepting bids and offers in the same quantity
(would-be self-loops in the diagram) are not considered,
because the only sensible clearing rule would simply return to each agent what he had delivered. The total
number of strategic DOF for all m agents is therefore
2m2 (m − 1).
The price for the jk market is defined by the notational
generalization of Eq. (1),
P jk
b
(12)
pjk ≡ Pi ijk ,
i qi

and is not forced by the institutional structure to satisfy
the dimensionally allowed relation pjk = 1/pkj , though
some solution concepts may lead to solutions with this
property. The allocation rule for agent i as a result of
trades in all markets combines Eq. (2) and Eq. (3):
!

X
X  kj
bjk
j
j
jk
i
Ai = a i +
−qi + jk +
qi pkj − bkj
. (13)
i
p
k6=j

k6=j
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Since bids are consumables, there are no separate monetary state variables, and each good changes as a sold
item and a money.
Note that failure of the double coincidence of
wants
aspec
n
o reduces each agent to 2 (m − 1) DOF, the

qijk 6= 0 in the (m − 1) markets for his endowed good,
n
o
in markets for other goods,
and the (m − 1) bjk
=
6
0
i
for which the endowment is used as means of payment.
The resulting total number of DOF is 2m (m − 1), and
the system leads to symmetric exchange solutions for specialists, which are computable at any m, as derived in
App. A 1. The efficiency of these allocations is less than
unity, but by the smallest margin the one-period noncooperative solutions can achieve.
Market 1 is thus agent-permutation symmetric and robust in allowing nonzero-trade solutions under allocation
constraints. If the costs of operating trading posts were
considered, though, it would also be the most costly of
the structures considered here at large m, because the
costs to maintain m (m − 1) trading posts must be paid,
even if agents can only use 2m (m − 1) of the degrees of
freedom they provide.
Market 2 (All-for-all, undirected)
gm

i
qijk
h[N ]i
bjk
i
 jk 
p

h

= gj
∀j, k
= various
= gk
∀j, k
=

gk
gj

g1

...

gm-1

∀j, k

m (m − 1) /2 markets. Payment in goods; no
short sales, no credit. NE computable, symmetric, but limited by allocation constraints
for m ≥ 3.

This market allows all-for-all exchange, like Market 1,
but reduces the number of trading posts needed in a natural way. Markets are again indexed superscript jk, but
there is now a unique trading post for direct exchange of
any pair of goods.
The cost of this simplification is that bids and offers,
rather than having separate roles in every market, become defined by context. All goods of type j delivered
to post jk are interpreted as q-values, and all goods of
type k at that post are interpreted as b-values. Since the
name jk or kj of the post is arbitrary within this convention, this implies the identity qijk ≡ bkj
i . At general endowments agen , eachnagent isothus reduced to m (m − 1)
strategic DOF, the

qijk , bjk
i

in the symmetrized mar-

kets, and the total number of DOF is m2 (m − 1).
Price is computed just as in Eq. (12), with the contextdependent definition of the bs and qs, but now by definition pjk ≡ 1/pkj . There is a natural modification of the
disaggregation rules for both goods, from Equations (2)

and (3): each agent gets a fraction of the total both of
the j and the k good, equal to his contribution to the
value at the jk post, (which may be measured relative
to any denomination). The value fraction for an agent i
may be written
!
1
bjk
qijk
qijk pjk + bjk
i
i
=
P jk + P jk , (14)
P  jk jk
2
0
q 0 p + bjk
0
i0 q 0
i0 b 0
i

i

i

i

i

and the allocation rules that follow from it (written with
either market naming order) is
!
1X
bjk
j
j
jk
i
Ai = a i +
−qi + jk
2
p
k6=j


1 X kj kj
= aji +
qi p − bkj
i
2
k6=j


jk
1 X jk
kj Q
j
.
(15)
qi − q i
= ai −
2
Qkj
k6=j

In the first line of Eq. (15) good j is treated as the bought
and sold consumable, while in the second line it is regarded as the means of payment for the other k 6= j
bought and sold consumables. In the last line (where
P
Qjk ≡ i qijk ), the order of jk is permuted in order to
express all quantities as qs, a convenience when maximizing utilities in App. A.
Under failure of the coincidence of wants aspec , each
agent still has (m − 1) DOF for a total of m (m − 1)
DOF, because there are precisely (m − 1) markets for any
single endowed good in exchange for other goods. The
solutions are still symmetric and computable at all m,
and the collection of markets is half as costly as those in
Market 1, in exchange for offering half the strategic freedoms. However, the clearing rule leads to large fractions
of returned goods, so if there is no short sale, for m ≥ 3
there is a shortage of either offers or means of payment
to attain the interior solution. This is demonstrated in
App. A 2. Thus agents would be better off spontaneously
breaking the symmetry of solutions in Market 1, and
abandoning one of the two markets for each good, but
continuing to use the conventional clearing rules. While
one might have expected that thinning of the markets in
the directed case would affect final allocations, this turns
out not to be the case in either the symmetric or fully
broken solutions, since only the replication index affects
the impact assessments.
Market 3 (Commodity standard, cash payment)
h i
gm
qij = g j ∀j 6= m, qim = 0
m
h[N i] = g
j
bi = g m ∀j 6= m, bm
i =0
 j
gm
p = gj ∀j 6= m, pm undef
g1

...

gm-1
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m − 1 markets. Payment in a preselected
good; no short sales, no credit. NE computable, but approach the no-trade solution
under allocation constraints.
This structure has m − 1 trading posts indexed simply
by the good j 6= m sold at them. Payment is in good m
and, comparable to the exclusion in the previous cases,
there is no market exchanging m for m. At
are
n agen there o

2 (m − 1) strategic DOF per agent – the qij6=m , bj6i =m

–

for a total of 2m (m − 1) DOF. A version of this market
is treated in Ref. [2], ch. 7, where the role of the mth
good as money is given precedence over its consumable
status.
Under failure of the coincidence of wants aspec , the
m − 1 agents of type i 6= m are reduced to oneoffer qii
each, while agents of type m have m − 1 bids bj6m=m .
There are thus 2 (m − 1) total DOF. However, the solutions are highly asymmetric because only one agent type
may bid in the commodity money, leading to solutions
that approach the no-trade allocation at large m. As the
efficiency of no-trade is zero, the efficiency of the solutions to this game decay as O (1/m).

Market 4 (Commodity standard, personal credit)
h i
qij
h[N i]
bji
 j
p

=

Ii (N )
gj

∀j 6= m, pm undef

g1

...

gm-1

m − 1 markets for goods. Payment in promissory notes for a preselected good, with one
clearinghouse for notes and that good. NE
computable at large m and survive under allocation constraints, but are not symmetric.
This structure has the same asymmetry as Market 3,
but softens the impact of the failure of coincidence of
wants by adding credit in the form of personal promissory notes to deliver the mth good. All notes are given
credit by the market price and allocation mechanisms (1
- 3) at face value, so promissory notes are substitutable
and the various dimensions Ii (N ) , i ∈ 1, . . . , mr may be
regarded as a single dimension. With the addition of
credit, bankruptcy rules are formally required to handle
the possibility of default in the promissory notes. However, for the interior solutions which it is the purpose
of credit to make possible, the bankruptcy constraint is
never binding, because there is net flow of good m to all
of the type i 6= m agents, motivated by its consumption
value.
While a “money market” for the mth good is now definable, bid with promissory notes in that good, this model
is distinguished by not including it, giving each agent

o

DOF, for total

j6=m

(When this interior solution is impossible because am
i
is too small, the bankruptcy penalties modify Eq. (16),
and induce an endogenous rate of interest, which is the
shadow price of the capacity constraint [2], ch. 6-7.)
The importance of credit is that at aspec , each agent
i
of type i 6= m is reduced only
n to m
o DOF, the qi for his
own endowment and m − 1 bj6i =m

(versus only 1 DOF

in Market 3). Agents of type m retain the m − 1 bj6m=m
that they have in Market 3, for a total of m2 − 1 DOF in
the system.
Final allocations at aspec , derived in App. A 3, while
not converging to the no-trade solution at large m as in
Market 3, are still not symmetric, however. Though at
m → ∞ and r → ∞ they converge to the competitive
equilibrium
[13], at large m and fixed r, they converge at

0
O (1/m) to a relation of the form
j

Ii(N)

qij6=m , bj6i =m

of 2m (m − 1). The allocation rule for the mth good replaces Eq. (2) with the clearinghouse value

X  j
j
m
j
(16)
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a
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i
i
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= gj
∀j 6= m, qim = 0
m
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= Ii (N ) ∀j =
6 m, bm
i =0

n

at agen 2 (m − 1) of the

Ajm →



1−

1
r



e1/r

Y
j

1

Aji6=m → e− r(r−1)

Y

AjCE ,

j

(17)
where AjCE is the final allocation (the same here for all
agents and all goods) that would be attained at a competitive equilibrium. At a level of resolution where there
are many goods in the world produced by specialists, but
relatively few truly equivalent producers of any one good
(small r), the agents called on to provide the standard of
value are penalized relative to the rest. Ultimately this
arises because, whereas all other agents have some strategic freedom to impact the prices of their own goods, the
provider of the numéraire loses this freedom. Though he
has reduced purchasing power relative to other agents,
in other respects he effectively becomes a price taker (as
borne out by the symmetry of Ajm among
n j, aoproperty of
the CE allocations but not the other Aji6=m in the NE.
The reduction in allocative efficiency due to the penalty
on type-m agents is not compensated by the slight windfall given to the other types, so the efficiency of this Market is the lowest of those that retain finite levels of trade
at large m.
The practical relevance of the asymmetry in this Market arises if one considers embedding its function into a
larger game involving the agents’ choice to become specialist producers versus generalists, and then embedding
that in the larger game of adopting a market structure as
well. If the rules of the larger games give agents “veto”
power over the adoption of a market structure, the requirement of Market 4 that the money-providers always
be disadvantaged could in plausible games prohibit its
adoption.
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The solutions in this case exist at all m, but are formally uncomputable due to an unspecified degree of wash
sales by each producer. The formal ambiguity occupies
an interval of relative size 1/m in price and final allocation, though, and so can practically always be placed
below some threshold of severity at large m. In this practical sense, NE are “computable” in a limit of sufficiently
many types.
Market 5 (Personal credit with bankruptcy law)
h i
qij
h[N i]
bji
 j
p

gm

= gj
∀j
= free
= Ii (N ) ∀j
=

Ii (N )
gj

Π
Ii(N)

∀j

g1

...

gm-1

m markets for goods. Payment in personal
promissory notes for an arbitrary numéraire,
credited at face value, with a court imposing bankruptcy penalties. NE are not computable.
One can attempt to patch up the asymmetry in Market 4 by adding a trading post for good m, in effect a
commodity money-market. At this point, since bids for
all goods are in terms of the same set of promissory notes
credited at face value, their denomination, and hence the
numéraire, becomes arbitrary up to its interpretation in
the bankruptcy laws. Thus with the adoption of a money
market the previously-money commodity is reduced to
just another consumable good, at interior solutions.
n Eachoagent naı̈vely has 2m DOF at agen , in the form of

qij , bji ∀j, giving 2m2 total DOF for the system. However, correct counting of the strategic DOF requires more
careful treatment of the bankruptcy penalty as it applies
to interior solutions.
The min operator in Eq. (5), having undefined derivative at zero argument, is unsuited to evaluating the gradients required by Nash equilibria. The discontinuous
derivative may be regularized for each agent by replacing
Eq. (5) with
Ui → U i + κ i M i

(18)

where Mi is defined in Eq. (3), and since there is no
source of initial debts, mi = 0, ∀i. The discontinuous
derivative is replaced in Eq. (18) with a set {κi } of KuhnTucker multipliers, one for each agent i. One represents
bankruptcy as a game between each agent and the courts,
where the
o tries to maximize Eq. (18) with respect
n agent
j j
to the qi , bi , and the courts try to minimize it with
respect to κi . It differs from a simple Kuhn-Tucker constraint in that the courts are only permitted the variation
0 ≤ κi ≤ Π.

At nonzero values of Mi , the derivative is manifestly
that of Eq. (5), while at Mi = 0, the derivative of the
penalty term with respect to Mi is κi . This gradient is set
equal to the gradient of Ui to obtain the first-order conditions on the final allocations. Symmetric, interior solutions exist, and in them no agent goes bankrupt,
but by
P
P
mi = 0, ∀i and the accounting identity i Mi = i mi ,
they satisfy exactly Mi = 0, ∀i, and 0 < κi < Π, ∀i.
If the Kuhn-Tucker expression of the min were nothing more than a regularization method for derivatives,
it would say that agents sample all bji values, and then
compare the relative merits of going bankrupt to buy 0a
little more of good j to that for a little more of good j .
Obviously this is the wrong interpretation for interior values of κi , which are set by the utilities and not the legal
value Π. Interior values are a device
for comparing the
0
relative prices of all pairs j and j of goods. They thus
represent a strategy evaluation in which bankruptcy is
not considered, and the relative values of the goods are
compared directly. In other words κi , like an ordinary
binding Kuhn-Tucker or Lagrange multiplier, is one negative DOF per agent, leading to −m DOF relative to the
naı̈ve count of 2m2 for the whole system.
2m2 − m is still not the correct DOF count for this
system, though, because there is an overall scaling freedom for the promissory notes bji → Λbji , where the same
Λ is applied by all agents. This scaling freedom reflects
the arbitrariness of the numéraire familiar in competitive equilibria. It obviously does not affect a strategic
ability of agents to change either allocations or utilities,
so the correct number of total DOF is 2m2 − m − 1 =
(2m + 1) (m − 1). However, this negative strategic degree of freedom is distributed over the agents, with two
consequences. First, showing it explicitly as a constraint
cannot be done within this model, because all constraints
have already been incorporated. Second, more important, and an expression of the same fact, it signals that no
selection process exists to arrive at a solution, even given
maximal rationality, if one makes the commonsense restriction that rationality should not be defined to include
lucky guessing.
The way to see the uncomputability of solutions is to
recognize that, even knowing everything about all agent
utilities and endowments, there is no way any agent can
know the scale other agents will use for all of their bji ,
because he cannot know their strategies. Since this scale
factor is not constrained by the NE solution itself, there
is nothing knowable outside the strategies that can solve
this dilemma.
Apart from the fact that agents have no way to find
NE solutions, a continuum of them indexed by the scale
factor Λ exists, both at agen , and aspec , and in the latter case they have the symmetry that the allocations of
Market
n 4 lack.
o Allocation constraints remove m − 1 offer
DOF qij6=i from each agent’s strategies, or m (m − 1)
from the total, leaving m2 −1. They are the same DOF as
m
in Market 4 except for two: Agent m can now offer qm
in
a market for his endowment, but this localized freedom is
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offset by the distributed constraint that overall rescaling
by Λ has no consequences for interior outcomes.
Market 6 (Personal credit monetized)
h i
gm
I (N)
I (N)
∀j
qij = g j
h[N i] = free
I (N)
ICB(N)
bji = ICB (N ) ∀j
 j
ICB (N )
p =
∀j
gj
m-1

1

m

g1

...

gm-1

0

the {λi0 }, with coefficients Mii that are functions of
o
n
the qij , bji . Assembling the constraints and the λs into
column vectors, the condition of perfect clearing may be
written
h 0i
(21)
[Mi ] ≡ Mii [λi0 ] = [0]

m markets for goods. Initial payment in
personal promissory notes for an arbitrary
numéraire, exchanged at a credit evaluator
for central-bank promissory notes, at a computed rate of exchange. NE computable at
large m, symmetric, and robust under allocation constraints.
Market 5 attempted to recover symmetry and introduced a new, severe form of uncomputability. The reason
for this failure is that it replaced a localized constraint
on agents of type m in Market 4, with a global scaling symmetry that was under the control of no-one, and
not deducible by anyone. The institution that retains
symmetry while restoring computability is effectively an
exchange-rate service, here considered as one function of
a Central Bank. (In Ref. [14], exactly the process used
here was modeled, but rather than considering exchangerate computation to define a new institution, Sorin described it as a modification to the clearing rule of the
posts, which were then necessarily regarded together as
a single centralized trading mechanism.)
Agents again offer and bid in the mornings at markets
for all m goods, in qij and personal promissory notes,
and as before, the denomination of the notes is arbitrary.
Now, though, the personal notes are not evaluated at face
value, so the markets do not deliver goods or disbursements right away. Rather, they
the notes along
n bring
o
j
with a record of the received qi to a Central Bank,
which computes a set of exchange rates λi , and returns
Central-Bank promissory notes on behalf of i to the trading posts according to a formula
bjCB(i) = λi bji ,

(19)

which notes become the effective deposit by agent i at
post j. The dimensions of λi are thus
[λi ] =

ICB (N )
.
Ii (N )

agent i onow represented in the uniformly denominated
n
bjCB(i) . Disbursements of Central-Bank notes to the
agents are made, and the Central Bank takes the agents
to a clearinghouse in the evening, where promissory notes
are exchanged back to their originators at the rates λi
defined earlier in the day.
The rule that the Central Bank uses to compute the
λi is that all promissory notes will clear exactly at the
end of the day, Mi = 0, ∀i, so that there is no need for
bankruptcy penalties. The n
{Mi }oare linear functions of

(20)

It is clear that with notes not credited at face value, the
bji at different i are no longer directly interchangeable,
and must be regarded as separate goods with distinct
dimensions, as in the Market 6 diagram.
Equations (1 - 3) are then evaluated by the markets
in the afternoon, as before, but with the bids for each

From Eq. (3) it is straightforward to compute the diagonal values
!
X
qij
i
1 − j bji ,
Mi = −
(22)
Q
j

and the off-diagonal
Mii

0

6=i

=

X qj j
i
b .
j i0
Q
j

It is then an elementary accounting check that
X
Mii0 = 0, ∀i.
i

h

0

i

(23)

(24)

0

Thus Mii is degenerate, and so has at least one eigenvector [λi0 ] of zero eigenvalue. (If there is more than
one null eigenvector, this indicates that the bids and offers allow the market to break up into more than one
independently-valued subsystems of exchange.)
n o
The null eigenvector(s) corrects any bji that are consistent with an interior NE, up to a uniform but independent rescaling by each agent i, to the NE with a single
consistent scale factor. Since [λi0 ] is a null eigenvector, its
overall scale is of course undetermined, and this is equivalent, up to notation, with precisely the ambiguity of the
numéraire common to competitive equilibria. The Bank
may choose any convention it likes to make the computation of [λi0 ] procedurally well-defined, but nothing about
the final allocations depends on this choice. Note that the
Central Bank is not required to compute a general equilibrium solution, like a Walrasian auctioneer, and that
the much simpler, linear note-clearing condition (21) remains exact whether or not agents’ bids are consistent
with a NE.
The agents’ strategies are now well-defined, and the
NE are computable within the context of Nashnoptimizao
tion. Each agent is rational to compute his bji as if
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o
n
all other agents were generating bji0 6=i with the same
assumed numéraire and scale, and as if all promissory
notes were to be credited at face value. In general, of
course, the scales assumed by different agents will have
no relation, but because each agent’s bids will have the
correct ratios internally, the scale scale factors chosen
will not matter.
n o
The scale-freedom of the bji , fixed in Market 5 by the
Kuhn-Tucker multiplier but restored as a bidding freedom in Market 6, is not a new degree of freedom, because
it is fixed by the clearing rule (21) fiscally, rather than
by threat from the courts. Thus one DOF per agent has
been added and subtracted, and in this respect the the
markets are the same. The only new feature in Market 6
is that the previously untraceable strategic symmetry,
the overall scale, is now explicitly fixed by any choice of
normalization made by the Central Bank, which can be
counted as the required −1 DOF. The counting of DOF
in both the agen , and aspec is thus the same as argued in
Market 5. Further, all of the NE are the same, and the
only consequence of the institutional difference is to make
them computable within a sensible rationality concept,
without requiring that this extend to include impossibly
lucky guessing. In particular, though, this means that
the solutions retain an uncomputability of the degree of
wash sales, which is only removed practically – that is,
restricted to price and allocations consequences in an interval of order 1/m – in the large-m limit. Calculations
showing that the solutions achieved by this market are
the same as those in the all-for-all markets are provided
in App. A 4.

A.

Foreign exchange or credit evaluation?

The evaluation service institutionalized here in a Central Bank has two interpretations, both correct, but both
specializations of different general concepts. One could
be called Foreign Exchange evaluation, and the other
credit evaluation. Both interpretations are forms of monetization of personal credit, which generalizes in a different way when issues of trust and visibility are introduced
to solution concepts to compensate for incomplete rationality or information.
In Market 6, every agent effectively produces his own
currency. The exchange rate evaluation occurs as if each
were a country bringing goods and otherwise-valueless
notes for trade to a set of international markets. The
real goods offered and bid for, together with the distribution of the currency, can be used by a “world bank”
to determine exchange rates, at which no country is left
holding another country’s valueless notes at the end of
the period. Values of real goods offered play an essential
part in the relative valuation of currencies.
Alternatively, exchange rate evaluation makes sense as
a form of credit evaluation in the absence of exogenous
uncertainty, and it is under this logical heading that it

is more usefully generalized. The function of credit evaluation in the monetization of credit is to exchange unreliable notes for reliable ones, at a rate that precludes
only some preventable defaults, in exchange for enabling
trades that would not be possible with cash payment
alone [15]. When default can result from exogenous uncertainty in the world, as well as strategically, this tradeoff is nontrivial and depends on some marginal valuation
of more trade versus more default.
With or without uncertainty about the world, there
can also be endogenous uncertainty about consistency
of agent strategies, as arises in Market 5 from the uncomputability of a uniquely defined scale factor for bji at
different i. The purely endogenous component is special,
though, in that it is entirely preventable with no sacrifice
in trade, because it requires only a coordination mechanism. The mechanism for removing default solutions
is the same for both forms of uncertainty – the imposition of exchange rates between personally- and centrallygenerated credit – but whereas this exchange rate generates an interest rate to balance default under exogenous
uncertainty, it reduces to a pure accounting tool in the
cases here, because complete repayment is always possible.

B.

The gauge structure of monetized credit

The relation of Markets 5 and 6 happens to be precisely
that between two well-understood classes of dynamical
freedom in physics. As shown elsewhere [11] in the context of competitive equilibria, the constrained maximization of utilities corresponds mathematically to the problem of identifying the energetically and probabilistically
preferred state of a macroscopic physical system (in this
case, at zero temperature, where it is call the “ground
state”) by minimization of certain thermodynamic potentials. It is a theorem in physics that, when the underlying
micro-dynamics of a physical system possesses a continuous symmetry that any single ground state is unable to
express, there must be a continuous set of such states, degenerate under the thermodynamic potentials. The impossibility of distinguishing one such state from another
by its thermodynamic properties corresponds to the impossibility of selecting a preferred equilibrium based on
utilities.
The interesting physical content of such undeterminable cases is that the propagation of the microscopically defined symmetries, from the local dynamics to a
relation among global states, may be done in two ways.
If only the global symmetry exists, the problem of coordination among the local elements to find a single ground
state can only be carried out by dynamics. The excitations propagating this information are known as Goldstone particles, and the problem of identifying a scale
for prices from the dynamics of expectations has already
been formulated as one of exchanging these particles [16].
The consequence of this fact for one-period models is
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that, if no time elapses to make dynamics definable, the
coherent best solution cannot be formed, as has been
shown in Market 5.
A physically different origin for symmetric ground
states arises from what is called gauge symmetry. A
gauge field is a globally-defined excitation whose value
serves as a reference for the scale of each of the locally
defined symmetry transformations.
Gauge fields create a new class of local symmetries,
which consist of changing the “gauged” value of the
local variable, while adjusting the reference value (the
“gauge”) of the field together with it to indicate no
change in the actual physical state. In the example of
Market 6, such a so-called gauge transformation is the
combination of
bji → eηi bji , ∀j at some i

(25)

with the corresponding adjustment that the Central
Bank will make:
λi → e−ηi λi ,

affect either the solution or its Nash computability. If,
on the other hand, the ground states are degenerate due
to the expression of some underlying global symmetry,
the coupling of that symmetry to a gauge field absorbs
the degeneracy into the gauge freedom, removing it from
the spectrum of uncomputables, and allowing it to be
computed even in a single period. [21]
An interesting issue when one comes to dynamics is
that the evolution of gauge fields (financial instruments)
and the underlying (commodities) is in general independently specified. While one must admit fluctuations
about the ground states for this dynamics to have any
consequence, such fluctuations are expected when one
weakens ideal rationality to limited information or computational capacity (introduces “trembles” of whatever
sort). Then the multiperiod solution states with financial instruments can be different from those without, even
if under perfect rationality they would be specified to be
the same at every instant.

(26)
C.

which any agent is free to induce independently of what
the others do. This leads to no change in the physical
outcomes of the market activities, and in a market where
the NE bids were computable from the utilities, like Market 4, creating an additional layer of paper in this form
would be a pointless thing to do. The addition of the
local rescaling symmetry is accompanied by a set of rules
for determining the gauge, here the constraints (21), so
the total number of DOF in the system, and its symmetry, is preserved.
Gauge fields become nontrivial when, as here, there
is a global symmetry of the ground states that can be
absorbed as one of the physically consequenceless degrees
of freedom in the gauge variation. Then the remaining,
physically meaningful values of the ground state DOF
can be specified instantaneously and in a symmetric way
by the gauge conditions, as was done in Market 6.
It is important to appreciate that a physical theory
with gauge fields is different from one without, in principle both in the instantaneous specification of its kinematics, or state space, which corresponds to the oneperiod models, and in the larger specification of its dynamics, which become definable over multiple periods.
The distinction may or may not be visible from the restricted kinematic perspective of the selection of equilibrium ground states, depending on whether they can
or cannot express the global symmetry that is gauged.
If there is no degeneracy of the one-period NE, as in
Market 4, then the addition of a layer of paper will not

Market 3 and Market 4 have the same DOF at agen ,
because this is the case of “enough cash, properly distributed” [17], in which the additional availability of

Hybrid cases

The six cases listed here are pure forms, maximally
symmetrized among those goods or agent types that are
not distinguished by some institution. In real economies,
subsets of goods can be connected to each other according to different paradigms, resulting in a hybrid graph
with elements drawn from more than one pure form.
Historically interesting cases, such as Bimetallism, can
arise in this way, though they also involve considerations
not tractable within the one period context, such as how
durable goods with modest short-term utility-of-holding
can become moneys to mediate exchange of other goods
with shorter lifetimes. Some examples of this type are
discussed in more detail in Ref. [1], but will not be pursued further in this paper, because the interpretive scope
of these calculations is too coarse to resolve what makes
them interesting.

VI. SUMMARY OF DEGREES OF FREEDOM
AND SYMMETRIES OF THE ONE-PERIOD
MARKETS

Table I summarizes the various indices computed for
the six market cases considered in Sec. V. It is noteworthy that there are a number of overlaps across columns in
the table as institutions are added or changed, in either
the specialist or generalist allocation situations.

credit is irrelevant to the Nash solutions. The models
differ in their robustness against boundary solutions, but
this does not affect the DOF count. It is, however, re-
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Prop.\Mkt.
1
2
3
4
5
6
Num. Mkts. m (m − 1) m (m − 1) /2
m−1
m−1
m
m
agen DOF 2m2 (m − 1) m2 (m − 1) 2m (m − 1) 2m (m − 1) (2m + 1) (m − 1) (2m + 1) (m − 1)
aspec DOF 2m (m − 1) m (m − 1) 2 (m − 1)
m2 − 1
m2 − 1
m2 − 1
Sym.
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Comp.
any m
m<3
NT
large m
N/C
large m
TABLE I: Summary of the properties of the one-period markets. First line is the number of trading posts, which would be
input for costs if larger institution-choosing games were being considered. Second line is DOF for unconstrained bids and offers;
third line is for the case of specialist producers. Fourth line indicates whether the NE have the same symmetry as the agents
in the specialist case. Last line is computability, where NT means degeneration to the no-trade solution, and N/C means not
computable. Large m denotes a limit not specifiable within the setting posed, but defined qualitatively in the solutions of
App. A. The value qualifying as “large” in a larger game would depend on a tradeoff between costs of maintaining trading
posts, and either cardinality of the utility or the costs of bankruptcy.

flected in the collapse of the cash market under aspec , as
reflected in the reduced DOF.
On the other hand, Markets 4 - 6 are indistinguishable for aspec , and indeed all provide finite-trade solutions under allocation constraints. Their difference is in
the computability of these solutions.

VII.
A.

CONCLUSIONS

Relations of symmetry to efficiency

The one-period exchange mechanisms summarized in
Table I produce three qualitative types of solutions,
which become more efficient as they become more symmetric, both under permutation of each individual’s
goods, and under permutation of individuals. There is
an intrinsic asymmetry of endowments in the generalized
Jevons failure aspec , while the preferences are assumed
completely symmetric. The efficiency of any market system considered here turns out to measure how effectively
it erases the endowment asymmetry as a property of the
allocations, and replaces it with the symmetry of the preferences, preferably without introducing any new asymmetry under permutation of agents. The difference in efficiency between any two market types, multiplied by the
initial wealth rma of the system, is the money-measure
of utility gain available to pay for any additional institutions required by the more efficient system.
If one assigns the pure no-trade solution as the consequence of strategic uncertainty of Market 5, this solution has efficiency ηN T ≡ 0. Barely better, the severely
allocation-constrained solution of Market 3, in which total exchange is limited by the endowments of the cash
holders, produce efficiencies η ∼ 1/m. Market 2, for
which symmetric interior solutions are limited by boundary constraints, are a more complex intermediate case in
which efficiency should asymptotically approach a limit
associated with trade by half the desired amount at large
m.
In contrast, as soon as credit is introduced, most goods
are traded, and efficiencies approach unity at large m

and r. The least imprint of the endowment asymmetry
on the final allocations is produced by Markets 1 and 6,
which preserve the joint permutation symmetry of agents
together with their endowed goods, and attain the re2
sult (A11): η ∼ 1 − 1/2m(r − 1) (though the latter does
so only at large m).
When the joint permutation symmetry of agents with
their goods is violated by the institutional structure itself, as in Market 4, even though most goods are traded,
the cost is a slightly reduced efficiency (A37): η ∼
2
1 − 1/2m(r − 1) − 1/2mr2 . At large r, the reduction in
welfare of the type-m agents, relative to the others, lowers efficiencies as much as the entire goods-asymmetry
for all agents combined in Markets 1 or 6.

B.

The path from barter to credit evaluation

As efficiency gains measure what wealth is available
to pay for institutions that facilitate trade, the multiplicity of institutions measures what must be paid for.
If one were to embed this analysis of one-period markets in larger games, where trading posts have costs of
operation, and the choice to specialize was accompanied
by productive economies of scale, a natural association
of market types with scales of trade could naturally be
made to arise.
For sufficiently infrequent or specialized trade, there
would probably be only barter, because the cost of sustaining even one post per good could not be supported by
the value of variance reduction accrued from a law of one
price. With more trade, but of limited types of goods and
with relatively little redundancy by suppliers, all-for-all
markets could achieve the best noncooperative equilibria
possible, without guessing and at any m. It would not
be necessary for the more centralized credit markets to
have gone undiscovered, in order for them not to exist.
Their non-existence would in a sense be determined by
their inability to make optimal NE computable for small
m.
As scales of trade grow, however, the cost of the allfor-all trading posts grows quadratically in the number
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of goods, even as the errors from mis-estimation of wash
sales in the credit markets declines. Given any structure of costs per post and per error, there will be some
scale above which all-for-all markets become unsustainable and centralized credit markets dominate.
These conclusions can be qualitatively drawn without
reference to exogenous uncertainty or the other roles of
credit evaluation, money as a surrogate for trust, or the
heterogeneity of volumes and market types that affects
real economies. Under addition of these complicating
factors, the general associations of market-system types
with scales of trade would then serve as an organizing
principle or tendency from which to recognize the deviations induced by combination.

The arguments of the fi , though, will be objects of
recurring interest, as this is the meaningful function of
consumables that measures the efficacy of markets, both
relatively among users in a single economy, and across
economies. For reference, as both the most symmetric outcome possible, and the one leading to the largest
utility all agents can simultaneously have, the allocation
product produced by a competitive equilibrium is (by
symmetry)
Y

=

 a m

, ∀i.
(A2)
m
In the derivations below, other allocations will be compared to the solution (A2), and found at large m to differ
by factors of the form
j
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Aji

CE

1+x
< 1, ∀x 6= 0,
ex

(A3)

where x will be various functions of the replication index.

APPENDIX A: ALLOCATION-CONSTRAINED
SOLUTIONS
1.

Noncooperative equilibria for all of the nontrivial market models are computed here at aspec endowments. Only
solutions with the maximal symmetry respected by both
the endowments and markets will be computed. In all
cases considered these exist, but they are unique only
where so noted. No attempt will be made to prove nonexistence of solutions that spontaneously break the symmetry of the endowments or markets, though in many
cases, such as replica-asymmetric solutions in the allfor-all markets, it is elementary to show that these do
not exist as long as preferences are convex and C 1 differentiable.
Because symmetric allocations are of interest, utilities
will be restricted to the form (10). The cardinalization
functions fi will never matter, and to factor them out of
the optimization equations, it is convenient to introduce
the notation for the log-derivatives


Y
d
(l)
 fi  Aji  .
Q
(A1)
fi ≡
j
d log
A
j
j i
δUi
(l)

fi

=

XX
j

k6=j

"

Market 1

The final allocations are given as a function of the
strategic variable choices by Eq. (13). Varying these,
P
P
jk
and adopting the notation B jk ≡ i bjk
≡ i qijk ,
i , Q
gives
δAji

=

X
k6=j

δbjk
i
− δqijk
pjk

!

bjk
1 − ijk
B


X  kj
q kj
−
δbi − pkj δqikj
1 − ikj
Q
k6=j

Maximally symmetric solutions permitted by the markets are those in which all agents offer the same amount
q ≡ qiik and bid the same amount b ≡ bki
i , for any
i 6= k. The price at any trading post in terms of these is

!

. (A4)

The parenthesized factors involving B jk and Qjk arise
from the agents’ own assessment of their impacts on
prices. It it through these factors that the NE differ
from the CE in all cases.
The condition of maximal utility for any agent i follows
from Eq. (A4) as

#


 

1 
jk
jk
j
j
jk
jk
j
1
−
b
/B
1
−
q
/Q
−
δb
−
p
δq
i
i
i
i .
Aki
pjk Aji
1

!

(A5)

p ≡ pjk = b/q, for any j 6= k. The only nonzero impact
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factors, respectively for bids and offers, are




bki
1
1 − iki
,
= 1−
B
r




q ik
1
1 − iik
= 1−
.
Q
r

(A9)

(A6)

The notation A+ may be introduced for the final allocation of any agent in terms of his endowed good, and A−
for his final allocation in any of the non-endowed goods,
by symmetry all the same. In terms of b and q, these are
Aii
q+b
= 1 − (m − 1)
,
a
a
Aj6=i
q+b
≡ i =
.
a
a

A+ ≡
A−

It is exactly solvable and unique for both A+ and A−
at all m > 1, but is useful to expand as a power series
in 1/m for comparison to nonunique solutions of later
markets:




1
1 + r−1
1
1
1
A+ =
1
+
+
O
,
=
1
m
r−1
m2
m + r−1




1
1
1
1
−
A =
.
1 = m 1 − (r − 1) m + O m3
m + r−1

(l)

fi



1
 a m
1 + r−1


, ∀i.
(A10)
Aji →
1
m
exp r−1
j
The allocative efficiency (11) corresponding to Eq. (A10)
is
Y

1/m
1
1 + r−1
.

η=
1
exp m(r−1)


(A7)

(As noted, the declaration of aspec by the matrix 7 is
bad notation, since different goods are supposed to have
different dimension, and as such should not be denoted
with the same quantity a. A similar crime is the use of
q to denote agent offers by different types. Those abuses
are fixed in Eq. (A7), because A+ and A− are properly
nondimensionalized, even if offers and endowments are
given different dimensions for each i. The proper definition of the symmetric allocation constraint is really
obtained by setting these nondimensional quantities to
take type-symmetric values, as is done in Eq.( A7).)
The intrinsic symmetry of the endowments, since it
is respected by the market structure, implies that for
symmetric solutions p = 1 ⇒ b = q. Substituted, with
the reduced notations (A6-A7) into Eq. (A5), give as the
only nontrivial relation

1 − r1
1
=
.
(A8)
A+
A−

δUi

The cost of this asymmetry of agents, in terms of reduction in the allocation product which is the argument
of the utilities, takes a particularly convenient form at
large m and any r > 1,

This solution, in this costliest of market structures (in
terms of number of trading posts) turns out to be the best
that one-period exchange among non-cooperating agents
who account for their own price impacts can achieve.
This market and the next are unique, in making this solution computable for any m, a feature that even the institutionally more complex credit markets will not have.
However, only this market makes the solution accessible
without short selling at finite m ≥ 3.

2.

Market 2

It is most convenient notationally to use the line from
Eq. (15) for the final allocations, in which all submissions
are treated as qijk , and the market-index order rather
than a q/b distinction is used to identify which good is
being submitted. Then the variation takes the simple
form
δAji

!


1X
Qjk kj
qikj
jk
=−
δqi − kj δqi
1 − kj , (A12)
2
Q
Q
k6=j

with Qjk defined as for Market 1. The variation of any
Ui is then

"
#


kj 
1 XX 1 
Q
kj
jk
=−
1 − qi /Qkj − jk k 1 − qi /Qjk δqijk .
j
2 j
Q Ai
Ai
k6=j

Agents can offer only their endowed goods, and for
symmetric solutions, the offers will be the same, allowing

(A11)

(A13)

the notation q ≡ qiik , for any k. This is the same as
the b = q property of the all-for-all-directed market, and
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implies Qkj /Qjk = 1. The offer impact in the second line
of Eq. (A6) is as before, and now includes the bid impact
up to the renaming of bids and offers at a post. The
expressions for final allocations of the endowed and nonendowed goods are also much the same, with the only
meaningful differences being in factors of 2:

clearing rule, but by having to put it up in the absence of
credit, the rule has made the optimal solution inaccessible to them. Market 1, meanwhile, has no such fragility.

3.

A

+

A−

Ai
q
≡ i = 1 − (m − 1) ,
a
2a
q
.
≡
2a

(A14)

Again Eq. (A8) follows from maximization, so that the
final allocations for all i are just Eq. (A9), and the argument of the utility remains as in Eq. (A10).
It is worth noting that q/2 in this market has the same
value as q + b in Market 1, so nominally each undirected
market is “thicker” than its directed counterpart. The
importance of thickness in this market, though, is that
the best the agents can do under their allocation constraints is reach a boundary solution approximating the
NE (often not closely) at m > 3. Combining Eq. (A14)
and the second line of Eq. (A9) gives the total outlay
q
2 (m − 1)
(m − 1) =
1 ,
a
m + r−1

(A15)

a fraction greater than one for m ≥ 3. More than half
of this, of course, agents have returned to them by the

δUi
(l)

fi

=

X

j6=m

"

1
pj Aji



1−

bji /B j



Market 4

The allocations (2) and (3) finally become simple with
this market, andPthe notation
Pfor total bids and offers
reduces to B j ≡ i bji , Qj ≡ i qij . The variation of the
consumable goods takes the simple form
δAji

=−

δqij

δbj
− ji
p

!

bj
1 − ij
B

!

.

There is also, for the first time in a nontrivial market, a
separate monetary state variable, in the form of a final
balance of promissory notes. Its variation is
δMi = −

X
j

δbji

−p

j

δqij



qj
1 − ij
Q

!

The absence of a trading post for the quantity denominating the promissory notes removes an offer-impact
factor for agents of type m, separating goods into three
categories: endowed, non-endowed, and the commodity
money. It is convenient to define the nondimensional
variables of the most-symmetric solutions by momentarily letting i be the index of a non-m agent and his endowed good, and j any other non-money index, so that

.

(A17)

Using the bankruptcy-modified utility (5) within a range
where the the min is identically zero, the optimization
condition is

#
 

1 
j
j
− m 1 − qi /Q
δbji − pj δqij .
Ai

This market structure has the least symmetry of those
considered. It admits a single offer variable q ≡ qii , and
as before requires two bid variables: one b+ ≡ bii for
the endowed good, and another b− ≡ bj6i =i,m for the nonendowed non-money good, for any i 6= m. Now, however,
there is a third bidding scale b0 ≡ bj6m=m by the provider
of the mth good, for all other goods, which for him are
not endowed. The total bids on any market may be given
the notation mb ≡ B j = b+ + (m − 2) b− + b0 , in terms
of which the price of each non-money good is p ≡ pj =
mb/q, for any j 6= m.

(A16)

with i 6= j 6= m ,




bi
b+
1 − ii
= 1−
B
rmb
!


j
b
b−
1 − ij
= 1−
B
rmb




j
bm
b0
1− j
= 1−
.
B
rmb

(A18)

(A19)

The offer impact is then relevant only for type i:

 

1
qi
1 − ii = 1 −
(A20)
Q
r
The final allocations for agents of type i are named as
before,


q
Aii
b+
+
=1−
A ≡
1−
,
a
a
mb
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Aji
q b−
=
,
a
a mb
m
0
A
b
≡ i = ,
a
a

The final allocation Mm (A22) may also be computed
in terms of the ratio b0 /rmb at general b values, as

A− ≡
Am

(A21)

except that now there are three of them, while the allocations for agents of type m must be given separate names
(as a mnemonic)
q b0
Ajm
=
,
a
a mb
Am
b0
≡ m = 1 − (m − 1) .
a
a

M− ≡
Mm

(A22)

The two nontrivial relations arising from Eq. (A18) for
type i are now




b+
b−
1 − rmb
1 − rmb
p

= m,
(A23)
=
1
−
+
A
A
1− r A
while the one relation for agents of type m is


b0
1 − rmb
p
=
.
M−
Mm

(A24)

In terms of these, the allocation product for the agents
of any type i 6= m are
Y j
(m−2) m
Ai6=m = am A+ A−
A ,
(A25)
j

while the allocations for the money-providers are
Y
(m−1) m
Ajm = am M−
M .
(A26)
j

As it follows from the definition of p and Equations (A21-A22) that pM− = Am , the two allocations
satisfy the relation
Y Aji6=m
j

Ajm

=



1−

b+
mb



1−

b−
rmb

(m−2) 


1 − 1r

 
exp − 1r
1

=
1
+
O
,
1
m
1− r

1−

b0
rmb



(A27)

where the second expansion is appropriate
at large m

as long as b+ /b, b− /b, b0 /b ∼ O m0 (as will be demonstrated momentarily).
Also from the price definition and Eq. (A24), it follows
that


b0
b0
=
1
+
,
(A28)
b−
rmb
which has a unique solution for b0 /b− , if b+ /b → 0. There
are thus unique solutions with no wash sales, which can
serve as a basis for the analysis of more general NE.

1 − (m − 1)

b0
1
=
a
1 + (m − 1) 1 −

b0
rmb



(A29)

Plugging this relation into Eq. (A22) for M− , the offer
constraint of no short sales q ≤ a implies the bound
 
b+
1
1
0≤ − ≤1+
+O
.
(A30)
b
r−1
m
Together with the relation (A29), this implies the asymptotically m-independent scaling of all components of bji
required to satisfy Eq. (A27).
The nature of the NE parametrized by b+ /b is easy to
understand, but implies a new form of uncomputability
for all solutions of this kind. It is clear that, given any
interior NE with b+ /b → 0 (which the above equations
yield), there is a neutral freedom for any single agent i to
engage in wash sales. Because at b+ /b → 0 he as offered
less than all of his endowment (solution is interior in Aii ),
he may always offer some additional increment of qii , and
increase his bii , without incurring bankruptcy penalties,
as long as his wash sales do not change the price.
Of course, if other agents knew he were going to thicken
the market, it would change their own impact assessments, and so their bids would not remain the same, by
Eq. (A28). Thus the neutral curve for any agent given
b+ /b → 0 does not coincide at general m with the oneparameter family of NE obtainable by the group as they
vary b+ collectively. Since any bii is subject to a neutral
variation, nothing about the NE condition can fix it for
any agent, and so cannot allow him to guess the value
that will be chosen by other agents either.
If one were to alter the solution concept, such as by
ranking the NE globally, the b+ /b → 0 solution would be
the least preferred, an algebraically tedious result, but
one whose origin is easy to understand. The reason the
allocation products of NE are smaller than those of CE
is that suppliers hoard their endowed good to some extent, because of 1 − 1/r decrease in the marginal value
of increasing offers, due to price impact. Any allowed
increase in wash selling stabilizes prices to some degree,
placing each agent in a situation slightly closer to that
of a price taker, and so reduces the hoarding tendency
and moves every agent’s allocations closer to the symmetry of CE. Thus the maximum wash sale possible is
the globally Pareto superior NE. At the same time, any
agent who chooses that outcome is maximally vulnerable
to bankruptcy, with its more severe penalty than a mere
reduction in allocations, and so any other NE is riskdominant over the maximal-wash-sale solution. Rather
than pursue the resulting choice among more refined solution concepts for this one structure, we prefer simply to
acknowledge the uncomputability of the standardly defined NE solution with the tools provided by bankruptcy
institutions alone.
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The problem of uncomputability is regulated at large
m by Eq. (A30), because no provider can impact either
the price or the total amount of his own bids at order larger than 1/m, by engaging in wash sales. With
vanishing price impact, the corrections by other agents
also disappear, and so the neutral curve for each agent
independently converges to coincidence with the collective change of b+ in the NE, implying that both become
strategically null changes. The entire range of NE then
correspond to the allocations for type i 6= m of
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1
1
+
1+
+O
A =
,
m
r−1
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1
1
1
−
1−
+O
A =
,
m
(r − 1) m
m3


1
1
,
(A31)
+O
Am =
m
m2
and for type m of
M−
Mm





1
1
1
1−
+O
,
=
m
r (r − 1) m
m3


1
1
=
.
(A32)
+O
m
m2

Thus, at large m but only there, for each agent it becomes rational to engage in any degree of wash sale within
the bounds imposed by the NE, and converging as 1/m,
the product of final allocations that is the argument of
his utility


1
 a m
1 + r−1
Y j


,
(A33)
Ai6=m →
m
exp 1
j

hyperplane
X

Ajm

j

P

j

Aji =


=a 1−

P

j

aji = a. From Eq. (A32) follows

1
+O
r (r − 1) m



1
m2



,

(A35)

and though Eq. (A31) is not evaluated to the order to
determine it, it follows by symmetry that
X
j

Aji6=m


=a 1+

1
+O
r (r − 1) m (m − 1)



1
m3



.

(A36)
These corrections to the type-i 6= m allocations only
perturb the efficiency at O 1/m2 , while the order-unity
reduction for type m versus the rest, in Eq. (A34), perturbs the efficiency at O (1/m). As a result, the overall
efficiency satisfies
1/m

"
 #
1


1 + r−1
1 − r1
1
1

 −

1−
+
O
.
η=
1
m
m2
exp − r1
exp m(r−1)
(A37)
The allocations become progressively less efficient as they
become less symmetric.

4.

Markets 5 and 6

the same for agents of type i 6= m as in Markets 1 and 2,
except that in Market 2 the absence of short sales made
this equilibrium unattainable.
Meanwhile, with the same order of convergence, the
allocation product for the money providers takes the limit

 a m
Y
1
1 − r1 Y j
j

Ai6=m → e− r(r−1)
Am →
.
1
m
exp − r j
j

The NE for both symmetric credit markets are identical, and it is more direct to compute them for the elementary Kuhn-Tucker form of the bankruptcy constraint
in Market 5. The solutions will therefore be computed in
that case, without regard for the fact that agents cannot
achieve them due to the scale ambiguity of bids. Since
the rational solution concept in Market 6 is to assume a
shared scale of bidding and continued bankruptcy limits,
the operation is the same, with the scale-factor corrections between different agents’ solutions merely supplied
by the evaluation agency after the fact.
The variations of allocations and moneys are the same
in Market 5 as Equations (A16-A17), but because the denomination of the promissory notes is now arbitrary relative to any of the consumables, the bankruptcy multiplier
enters in a meaningful way into the Nash optimization
(interior solutions for the consumables no longer make
the bankruptcy constraint slack). The variation of the
Kuhn-Tucker form (18) of the utility then becomes



(A38)

r−1

(A34)
It is indeed smaller than that for the other types by the
factor in Eq. (A27), which is in turn smaller by a factor
of the same basic form (A3) than the CE solution.
The final allocation from this market is the only one
in the one-period exchange taxonomy that falls off the

δUi
(l)

fi

=

X
j






!
j


1
q
κ
i
j
j
j

 1− i


δb
−
p
δq
−
,
i
i
(l)
Qj
pj Aji 1 − qij /Qj
fi
1 − bji /B j
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where the magnitude of the penalty variable Π does not
(l)
matter as long as the cardinalization of fi makes fi
sufficiently small.
There are now solutions entirely symmetric in the offer
variable q ≡ qii , and in terms of only two bid variables
b+ ≡ bii , b− ≡ bj6i =i , for any i. The total bids on any
post may be denoted almost as before, mb ≡ B j = b+ +
(m − 1) b− , and in that notation p ≡ pj = mb/q, for any
j.
The first two lines of Eq. (A19), and Eq. (A20), again
describe the only nonzero impact factors, and the final
allocations A+ ≡ Aii /a and A− ≡ Aj6i =i /a again take the
form in the first two lines of Eq. (A21), in terms of the
present definition of mb. The first equality of Eq. (A23)
remains true, as the only nontrivial relation. In these
markets it defines a unique solution for b+ /b → 0.
To obtain a bound on wash sales, one can introduce
the parameter ζ ≡ b− /b, and show that


ζ
1 − rm
q
ζ =


1
a
/ 1 − r1
1 + r2ζm 1 − m


ζ
1
.
(A39)
= 1−
+O
(r − 1) m
m2
As before, q/a ≤ 1 implies a bound on ζ at order 1−1/m,
showing that b+ /b lies in a range around unity of size
≤ m0 . Thus again, at large m but only there, the
neutral curve of independent wash sales for each agent
converges to the joint curve of b+ -parametrized NE, for
which the allocations become degenerate.
To estimate the allocations simply, one observes that
b+ /b → 0 ⇒ ζ → m/ (m − 1), in which limit




1
1
1
+
A =
1+
+O
,
m
r−1
m2




1
1
1
−
1−
+O
.(A40)
A =
m
(r − 1) (m − 1)
m3
The allocations (A40), correct to the stated order at all
allowed b+ /b, agree with Eq. (A9) and the relevant lines
of Eq. (A31) to those orders, and for all agents i. The
allocation product, and with it the efficiency, is thus the
same as the result (A10) produced by the all-for-all markets, though only as a limit.

his allocations. There is some freedom in how to assign
these values for the utility problem at aspec , but it does
not affect the outcome of the derivation. The simplest
n o
choice is to work only with the allocations xi ≡ Aji
internal to the system, and impose an arbitrary normalization on prices to assign values to bundles. The main
derivation in the following subsections will be done this
way, and only at the end will a more general “cash valuation” be considered, to show the detailed relation to the
constructions of Ref. [11].

1.

The expenditure function and the contour
money-metric utility

Using the utility representation Ui of Eq. (10), and
any normalization convention for prices, the expenditure
function has the usual definition [19]
ei (p, Ui ) ≡

X

pj Aji ,

 
where p ≡ pj is a vector of given prices, and the Aji are
Hicksian demands, at which agent i would be in equilibrium
prices and utility scale Ui . A scale factor
Q jat those
−1
(Ui ) is imposed on demands by Eq. (10),
j Ai = f i
and the directionality by the set of equilibrium relations
pj
Q

j

0

pj



1/m =
0

Q

j

Aji

0

Aji

0

The mapping from the potential theory of physical
thermodynamics [18] to a similar potential formulation
of utility theory [11] is based on two quantities: the expenditure function [19] ei (p, Ui ) for each agent, and a
dual contour money-metric utility µi (xi ), defined from
an allocation contour in the Pareto set. In this notation
p is an arbitrary vector of normalized prices, Ui any ordinal utility representation for agent i, and xi a vector of

0

1/m

,

(B2)

expressed in a form that is independent of both price
normalization and utility scale.
Where the expenditure function (B1) defines a moneymetric utility relative to a vector of prices and an ordinal
Ui , the dual contour money-metric utility [11] is a function of demands, and amounts to a particular choice of
cardinalization fi . Because the Pareto set for the sample
cases aspec is characterized by constant prices, the two
forms will coincide on the Pareto optima.
Prices on the Pareto set satisfy
0

pj = pj , ∀j, j ,
APPENDIX B: THE THERMAL POTENTIALS
FOR SPECIALIST TRADERS

(B1)

j

(B3)

and we may as well adopt any of the number of normalizations that set these pj = 1, ∀j. Just as price components
are equal, by permutation symmetry among the goods,
the “best-exploitation” allocation to which an external
speculator could induce agent i to trade satisfy
0

Bij = Bij , ∀j, j .
0

(B4)

These are points on the Pareto set such as PO(1) and
PO(2) in Fig. 1.
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n

Bij

o

to satisfy Eq. (B4), and also be in the
n o
indifference set of some allocations Aji (such as those
For the

produced by a NE of one of the market cases),
 m Y 0
Bij
=
Aji ,
j

(B5)

0

for any nj. The
o contour money-metric utility µi at any
bundle Aji is then defined as the value of the best-

clear that
Pthe appropriate normalization convention for
prices is j pj = m, so that Ui functions as a numéraire.


h i
~i ,
Introducing a vector notation Ai ≡ Aj ≡ Ui , A
i

p ≡ (1, p
~) for prices and allocations, and performing an
orthogonal transformation on allocations and prices, one
can make the separation
X
pj Aji
p · Ai ≡
j





X
X j
1
~i
≡ 
pj  
Ai  + p~ · A
m j
j

exploitation bundle (B5) at its equilibrium price:

µi

n

Aji

o

=

X
j



Bij = m

Y
j

1/m

Aji 

.

The economic work potentials defined in Ref. [11] are
essentially various surpluses, of the expenditure function (B1) over the contour utility (B6), scaled to some
common reference price.
2.

~i ,
= Ui + p
~·A

(B6)

where the last line follows from the normalization of p.
From the definition (B6) and the directionality relation (B2), it follows that
h under
i any differential change of
final allocations δAi ≡ δAji ,

1/m

Y
δµi .
p · δAi =  pj 

A symmetric value index for measuring wealth

The idea of an intrinsic, monetary welfare measure for
the allocations of an economy is based on the ability of an
external speculator, by offering differential pricing among
agents, to extract a maximal bundle of goods from them
collectively, after which they will have no more desirable
trades to pursue. To give a money value to the extracted
bundle, there is usually assumed to be a common price for
at least one good, which for convenience is held constant
during the extraction. In general there is more than one
such final allocation from the point of view of the agents.
To distinguish among them the one that defines the intrinsic welfare measure, it is assumed that the speculator
has has no way to value goods other than the one at the
fixed price, and so chooses a final allocation in which he
holds none of those goods.
n o
In this problem, using the internal variables Aji only,
there is no single relative price that can be held constant
in passing from the endowments to any Pareto optimum,
and still be symmetric among the agents. There is, however, a natural symmetric bundle of goods, and extracting any maximal amount of it leaves all agents somewhere
within the original Pareto set, where that bundle is valued at the unique price pj = 1, ∀j. It is thus natural to
let the Pareto value of the extracted symmetric bundle
be the money measure of welfare even when there is no
common price shared by all agents during its extraction.
This can also be shown formally to be the correct choice
by adding a “cash” market with a shadow price for the
symmetric bundle, but since that increases notation and
adds nothing to the solution, it will only be summarized
briefly at the end.
The symmetric bundle
P for each agent i will be given the
designation [22] Ui ≡ j Aji . With this choice it becomes

(B7)

(B8)

j

Combining this with Eq. (B7), one gets the conservation
law for Ui in terms of extracted non-numéraire goods
~ i and gained contour utility
−δ A


δUi ≡ δ 

X
j



Aji 



~i + 
= −~
p · δA

Y
j

1/m

pj 

δµi . (B9)

Eq. (B9) corresponds to the physical conservation of internal energy for some i’th thermal subsystem in a collection [18]:
δUi = −pδVi + T δSi ,

(B10)

where p in physics is pressure, Vi is the subsystem volume, and pδVi is the work done by the subsystem i on
its environment (here the speculator). The economic allocation Ai generalizes volume to a vector-valued extensive state variable, and p (price) generalizes pressure to
the conjugate vector-valued intensive variable [11]. In
physics T is temperature and S entropy, prompting the
1/m
Q
j
identification T ↔
, and Si ↔ µi . These
jp
identifications are in fact the same as those made in
Ref. [11] apart from the absence of any exchangeable
“heat” component to the entropy, because for the moment the agents are not coupled, even formally, to a
source of fixed prices.
3.

The work potentials of markets

For the reversible legs of the extraction process (the
transformations along indifference surfaces in Fig. 1), the
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profit delivered to the speculator by each agent comes
from Eq. (B9) in the δµi → 0 form
~i.
δUi = −~
p · δA

(B11)

Meanwhile, from any allocation-preserving initial condi~ accumulated by the speculator from taktion, the total A
P R ~
ing the agents to the contract curve is zero:
δ Ai =
i
0. If the speculator starts from the initial endowments,
he can extract
XZ
δUi = rma,
(B12)

to the value at the Pareto optima:
n o
n o
P
Si Aji
Bij
i Ui
=
η= P
rma
i Ui |P.O.

(B18)

This is precisely the ratio of actual “work” denied by
the agents to the speculator, to the best they could do.
Evaluating Eq. (B18) by means of the definition (B6)
then gives the result (11) in the text.
4.

Formal use of reservoirs

i

leaving each agent i at the origin, where
Ui (0) = 0.

(B13)

(This transformation can be regularized by taking the
limit of transformations along the dashed hyperbola in
Fig. 1. As the initial allocations approach aspec , the speculator’s best-extraction bundle for agent i approaches the
origin.)
When utility does change, it follows from the conser1/m
Q
j
vation relation (B9) that at fixed T ↔
p
, the
j
R
~
work − p
~ · δ Ai extracted from each agent i equals the
maximum change in the so-called Helmholtz potential
Ai ≡ U i − T S i
=

X
j


1/m
Y
.
Aji − m pj Aji 

(B14)

j

Ai is a potential for prices because it satisfies the relation
∂Ai
∂Aji

= −pj ,

(B15)

T

for either reversible or irreversible changes.
In particular, this applies to comparisons among the
final Pareto optima at which the speculator could leave
~ i ≡ 0, so δUi =
each agent i. Then, T ≡ 1, and all δ A
δSi ≡ δµi , and from Eq. (B13),
n o
n o
Ui Bij
= Si Aji
,
(B16)

n o
for Bij satisfying Eq. (B5).
It is clear that if agents can trade internally to the
contract curve, by whatever means, endowments are preserved, and at any Pareto optimum
X
XX j
Ui |P.O. =
ai = rma.
(B17)
i

i

j

Thus it is natural to define the efficiency η of any final
state to which the agents could be brought by a n
speculao
P
tor as the ratio of their resultant holdings i Ui Bij

The inability to hold any nontrivial price fixed (meaning, other than the normalization) during an extractive
process can be overcome by formally introducing an external market for some form of “cash”. This fulfills the
role of the “world market” that assigns values to internal goods in Ref. [11]. Incorporating such an external
market extends agent i’s allocation
o to include a

nbundle
j
new “money” variable: xi ≡ Mi , Ai , and a fixed
price for Mi is introduced if the world market accepts
only exchanges
X j
δAi + πδMi = δUi + πδMi = 0.
(B19)
j

The external money may be considered intrinsically
valueless to the agents, thus not changing the preference
structure we have assumed for them, but still be given
a formal presence in the utility, by assuming the world
market accepts only cash payments, and the agents have
no initial endowments of Mi . The first constraint implies
Mi ≥ 0 always, while the intrinsic valuelessness implies
that agents will never surrender any of the consumable
Ui to acquire a finite stock of it. The two considerations
are satisfied simultaneously by a utility of the form

1/m
Y j
Ui (xi ) ≡ m Ai 
+ κ i Mi ,
(B20)
j

where κi is now a proper Kuhn-Tucker multiplier, taken
as minimizing Ui on the range [0, ∞), and the contour
money-metric form (B6) has been used to define fi to
avoid the step of a later translation.
Prices are identified by varying the utility (B20) extended by the budget constraint with yet another KuhnTucker multiplier λi :



X
δ  Ui − λ i 
pj Aji + πMi  = 0.
(B21)
j

Solving Eq. (B21) gives the marginal utility of Mi , which
is a sort of shadow price,
κi = 
Q

π
1/m ↔ T
j

π
jp

(B22)
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The expenditure function becomes
X
pj Aji
ei (π, p, Ui ) = πMi +

but now relates to the contour utility as

j

~i,
≡ πMi + Ui + p~ · A

(B23)

and the contour money-metric utility µi is simply Ui of
Eq. (B20). The Helmholtz potential has the relation to
ei and µi given in Eq. (6) of Ref. [11]:


Ai = e i − 

Y
j

1/m

pj 

~i,
µi − p~ · A

(B24)

in which the terms involving Mi cancel exactly, recovering the form (B14). The entropy is the same function,
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